The first implication of the Japanese deflation experience is surely that the debate on liquidity trap rekindled for the first time since the 1930s. Chapter 4 by Ito and Mishkin, which I recommend readers read first, gives an overview of Japanese deflation experience and its monetary policy over the period since the late 1980s. The authors are quite critical of the Bank of Japan for its policy management, but that indicates how difficult for central bankers to deal with a liquidity situation.
In a liquidity trap situation, the zero nominal interest rate or extremely low rates would make economic agents indifferent between money and bond, and also make monetary policy essentially ineffective. A combination of deflation and liquidity trap can lead to higher real interest rates and output stagnation, that can even further expectations of deflation and higher real interest rates, thereby causing a vicious cycle of persistent deflation and lingering recession. A wide variety of policy measures have been discussed to get an economy out of such a trap, but policy agendas are quite different roughly between the monetarist and Keynesian views. The monetarists view the liquidity trap solvable by implementing unconventional money easing -or "money gift" in Friedman's words -such as Japan's "quantitative easing" policy and direct purchasing by the monetary authority of corporate papers and long-term foreign and domestic bonds. In the Keynesian view, expansionary fiscal policy is the conventional measure to a liquidity trap. From this view, creating expected inflation can also be an important aspect of monetary policy as Krugman (1998 Krugman ( , 2000 argues. Svensson (2001) extends this argument and suggests a fixed exchanged rate policy to create expected inflation until the liquidity trap situation disappears. More generally, deflation may not just be an East Asian phenomenon, but can occur in a country that experiences an asset price boom. The recent Japanese experience has shown that deflation can occur in the aftermath of an asset price boom, and also that the possibility of a post-bubble deflation can pose a most challenging problem to monetary policy makers. That is, in the event bubbles in asset prices occur, central bankers face the necessity to tighten policy so that they can preempt inflation. However, tightening policy could overkill the bubbles and cause severe asset deflation from market meltdowns if monetary authorities did not loosen policy soon enough after the burst of the bubbles.
The intricacy and difficulty of monetary policy in such a situation is fully explained by Robinson and Stone's article (Chapter 2). Using a simple model, the authors depict monetary policy making when the economy is possibly facing a developing bubble and how it can be constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rates. According to the authors, the impact of policy measures can depend on whether they understand the stochastic properties of the bubble. In the literature, Bernanke and Gertler's (1999) argument -that central bankers should not attempt to incorporate the behavior of asset markets in their policy making unless the markets are sending clear signals about the state of inflation -seems to be a consensus.
However, this chapter makes the issue of whether and how to incorporate asset price bubbles in monetary policy making still a highly debatable issue. It is also relevant to the current conditions in the world economy where emerging market countries, most notably China, seem to be experiencing asset price bubbles.
The Japanese experience has also reminded many economists that how severe the outcome of the deflationary fallout from a meltdown can be depends upon the level of development of financial markets in the economy -in terms of the effectiveness or existence of proper risk management and prudent financial administration, not of the market size. Generally, a banking industry lacking a system and/or skills of appropriate risk management tends to rely too much on collateral values of some real assets such as land, and underdeveloped financial administration often allows over-extension of credit during a real asset boom. Therefore, once the asset market crashes, banks can get easily riddled with non-performing loans, that can feed the market underperformance and severely worsen capital conditions of the banks, eventually leading to a spiral dwindling of the banking industry and the whole economy. And this is what happened in Japan during the 1990s, and something many countries, especially those which are experiencing a boom in asset markets and which have institutional weakness in their financial systems, can experience.
In underdeveloped financial markets, liquidity or depth of the markets can matter greatly; the liquidity can fluctuate more easily in shallow markets and the markets can be more vulnerable to liquidity shocks, making the functionality of financial intermediary volatile. Furthermore, deflation can make this environment worse by hurting firms' balance sheets and also by making merely holding money more comparable to holding assets. On this issue, Choi and Cook (Chapter 8) make important contributions. Choi and Cook investigate stock market liquidity during the deflationary period in Japan. They show that the general liquidity level of Japanese equity markets declined during the period. Their empirical findings also show that firms with illiquid balance sheets and illiquid markets for their equity are more susceptible to liquidity shocks while their vulnerability is found to correlated with the firms' performance. Using aggregated data, the authors also evidence that exogenous liquidity shocks can negatively affect money demand, interest rates, and output.
Last, but not the least, the Japanese experience of deflation made it clear that policy coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities can be extremely difficult.
From the Keynesian view, fiscal intervention is an important tool to boost the aggregate demand especially when monetary policy is ineffective in a liquidity trap situation.
However, as Japanese experience shows, fiscal expansionary policy can also lead to enlarging the public debt of the country, whose real cost can be increased by deflation.
Iwamura, Kudo, and Watanabe (Chapter 6) and Ball (Chapter 7) look into the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy for Japan.
Ball's chapter investigates an interesting and ambitious question: how an economy facing liquidity trap, as Japan did in the early 2000s, should implement fiscal stimulus so as to have an effective effect on output while avoiding dire long-run fiscal consequences. He finds that an expansionary fiscal policy on a substantial scale, whether financed by money creation or bonds, could bring about short-term recovery and lead the economy to a steady state with output at potential and steady inflation in the long-run while also improving the debt-income ratio. However, money finance can prevent the public debt from running up in the short-run that can arise with debt-financed stimulus policy. Hence, the "helicopter drops" of money, or money-financed fiscal stimulus is preferable to bond-financed one in a liquidity trap situation.
Thus, deflation and the liquidity trap have multidimensional implications on different sectors of the economy. However, from the 1930s to the 1990s, these implications were buried in monetary policy makers' efforts to lower inflation, that was prevalent in most of the central banks in the world especially in the post-WWII era.
However, as Rogoff (2003) and others argue, more appreciation for central bank independence and credibility and globalization have made inflation come down to lower
